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Valuation of the gains from protection of biodiversity is difficult because the services 
that provide the benefits do not normally pass through markets where prices can form.  
But  the  services  sometimes  pass  through  markets  where  consumers  or  producers 
behave in a market-oriented manner, and so the values implicit in this behaviour can 
be identified and derived.  Estimates of the benefits of biodiversity protection are 
derived from the costs of protecting native plant communities from a major weed in 
Australia, by following this approach.  In 1999, invasion of coastal areas of New 
South Wales by bitou bush (Chrysanthemoides monilifera subsp. rotundata (DC.) T. 
Norl.)  was  listed  as  a  key  process  threatening  native  plants  under  the  NSW 
Threatened  Species  Conservation  Act  1995.    In  accordance  with  the  Act,  the 
Department of Environment and Climate Change prepared a Threat Abatement Plan 
(TAP) to reduce the impacts of bitou bush on biodiversity at each threatened site. The 
costs of protecting sites vary closely with the number of priority native species and 
communities at each site.  Following standard economic assumptions about market 
transactions, these costs are interpreted to provide values the benefits of protecting 
extra species, communities, and sites.  
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Despite  at  least  50  years  of  effort,  values  for  the  benefits  from  protection  of 
biodiversity remain elusive, mainly because the environmental services that provide 
these gains do not pass through markets where prices form.  But they often pass 
through other kinds of markets and, as Sinden and Worrell argued (1979), we can 
identify  these  markets  to  estimate  the  implied  benefit  values.  The  markets  may 
represent consumers purchasing the services, producers supplying them, or even the 
market transaction itself. As the literature review will indicate, the methods to model 
consumer purchases have dominated valuation but the values they indicate sometimes 
lack  consistency.  Applications  of  methods  to  model  producer  behaviour  are  less   3
common because they require data on costs of protection - - but the methods would 
appear to be particularly relevant because they are based on actual expenditures.  
 
A data set has become available for the costs of controlling a major weed at over 300 
sites in coastal New South Wales, Australia, namely bitou bush [Chrysanthemoides 
monilifera subsp. rotundata (DC.) T. Norl.].  The data include expenditures to control 
the weed at the site, and the number of threatened native species, communities and 
populations at each site.   These, and their associated data, are now used to value the 
benefits of biodiversity protection from the costs of doing so. 
 
Bitou Bush arrived from South Africa around 1908, and has now spread to 80 per cent 
of coastal New South Wales.  In 1999, this invasion was listed as a key threatening 
process under the NSW Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.  In accordance 
with the Act, the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) has prepared a 
Threat  Abatement  Plan  (TAP)  explicitly  to  reduce  the  impacts  of  bitou  bush  on 
biodiversity (DEC, 2006).  The cost of implementing the TAP, at each of the more 
than 300 affected sites, is estimated to be $2.85m pa. 
 
The goal of the paper is therefore to estimate values for the benefit of protection of 
native plant species, native plant communities and the threatened sites themselves.  
The objectives are to derive these benefits by (a) interpreting the actual total costs 
incurred to protect sites, (b) isolating the cost of protecting species and communities 
from the other components of total site cost, and (c) estimating the benefits at the 
market equilibrium quantity protected as well as at the mean quantity as in (b). The 
defensive-expenditure method provides a theoretical framework in which to analyse 
the costs and separate the effects of biodiversity from other factors that influence the 
expenditures. 
 
2 The valuation of biodiversity 
 
2.1 What is to be valued? 
The object of value should be the increase in the quantity of environmental services 
from protection of the native plant communities from the weed invasion.  This is the 
change  in  actual  quantity  of  services  themselves,  rather  than  the  change  in  the 
resources  that  provide  the  services.  Further,  the  values  for  the  increases  in 
environmental services should be the values that would arise in a competitive market 
for those services. 
 
The extreme impact of weeds on the natural environment is the extinction of species 
and  associated  loss  of  biodiversity.    But  biodiversity  is  not  usually  traded  in  a 
competitive market so there are normally no prices to form the basis of the economic 
values.  In response, methods have been devised to apply market concepts to value 
biodiversity and the protection of species.   
 
There are three kinds of method to estimate unpriced values, namely those based on 
(i) demand and willingness to pay, (ii) supply and costs of protection, and (iii) market 
prices.  Market prices rarely exist for environmental services or their associated goods 
and services, so this review concentrates on demand and supply-based methods. 
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2.2 Demand and willingness to pay 
Contingent valuation and choice modelling use survey questions to elicit household 
willingness to pay to protect a species, a community, a habitat or an ecosystem.  The 
basic procedure is to ask the survey question, how much are you willing to pay for 
thing X?  For example, Bennett (1982) asked 544 people in Canberra how much they 
were willing to pay, as a lump sum, to protect the natural ecosystem in the Nadgee 
Nature Reserve on the south coast of NSW.  The 95% confidence interval for their 
willingness to pay ranged from $20 to $33 for the 60% of the sample who offered 
bids.  Bennett concluded that the protection of this biodiversity is likely to be worth 
$20 per adult resident of Canberra. 
 
Each Victorian household was willing to pay $118 per year to preserve all endangered 
species in Australia, according to a survey by Jakobsson and Dragun (1996).  This 
payment would give a total value for all Australian households of $850m per year, or 
$271m for the 2.3m households in NSW. Lockwood and Carberry (1998) estimated a 
lump-sum willingness to pay of $1.69 per household to protect an endangered species. 
This is equivalent to $3.89m per species for all 2.3m households in New South Wales 
or  $195,400  per  year.    Kennedy  and  Jakobsson  (1993)  estimated  that  individual 
Victorians would pay $40 per head per year to protect the Leadbeater’s Possum in 
Victoria, giving a payment of  $194m per year for all  Victorians. McLeod (2004) 
reviewed the values placed on biodiversity protection in this kind of study and found 
that Australian households said they were willing to pay between  $11 and $118 a 
year  to  protect  an  endangered  species,  giving  a  state-wide  range  of  $25.3m  to 
$217.4m. 
 
Contingent valuation is, basically, valuation of a single good though a single question.  
Choice modelling requires respondents to choose between bundles of several goods 
and where the cost of the bundle is given.  The choices are analysed to infer the value 
of each good or service in the bundle.  Rolfe et. al. (2000) apply choice modelling to 
estimate the willingness to pay  for protecting native woodland in  the Queensland 
Upland Desert region.  The representative respondent in the survey proved willing to 
pay $11.39 per year to maintain an endangered species.  This is equivalent to $26.2 m 
for a population of 2.3m households, assuming one respondent per household.  
 
Van Bueren and Bennett (2004) use choice modelling to assess the size of benefits of 
improvements  to  waterway  health,  rural  aesthetics,  and  species  protection  at  a 
national level.  They argue that the implicit prices from the modelling provide the 
basis for assessing the size of benefits associated with such improvements.  Their 
benefit  for  protection  of  70  (unspecified)  endangered  native  species  (plants  or 
animals) was valued at $46.90 per household each year for 20 years, which becomes 
an annuity of $960,000 per species for 2.3m households. 
 
The Priority Evaluator Technique (Hoinville  and Berthoud, 1970) and the Budget 
Allocation Method (Sinden and Worrell, 1979) were the methodological forerunners 
of Choice Modelling.  Both also require respondents to choose between bundles of 
goods although both allow the price paid for the bundle to vary whereas in Choice 
Modelling the budget is fixed at one of a range of amounts.   O’Hanlon and Sinden 
(1978) estimated the existence value for a particular national park to be $6.25 out of a 
recreation budget of $17.50 giving a total value for protecting all species in the park  
for all 41,000 family visits to the park of $255, 300 per year.   5
 
2.3 Supply and costs  
The cost methods interpret expenditures on the supply of environmental services, to 
derive the benefit values implicit in the expenditures.  There are many different kinds 
of  expenditure  involved  in  the  provision  of  these  services,  including  the  costs  of 
directly controlling a weed, costs that are avoided in the future when the weed is 
controlled  today,  and  expenditures  to  defend  the  existing  biodiversity  resources.  
Interpretations of these costs, to provide benefit values, have included the following. 
 
•  Expenditures that are actually undertaken can give minimum estimates of the 
value of the associated benefit.   
•  Future costs, that are actually avoided, are a benefit.   
•  If vegetation is depleted, the associated loss of soil and water conservation 
may lead to loss of agricultural output which is a cost. 
•  Managers undertake control expenditures to maintain a level of environmental 
service, and these defensive expenditure method estimates the values of these 
gains from the expenditures themselves. 
 
All these methods are based on actual costs and so should provide reliable values of 
their particular values, but all are likely to give minimum estimates of benefit.   
 
Governments  undertake  expenditures  to  protect  environments  in  various  ways, 
although their motivations may not always match those of producers in the standard 
market model.  Their annual support of government agencies is complemented by 
one-off  payments  for  special  purposes.    For  example,  in  2002,  the  Queensland 
Government agreed to contribute $200m to protect threatened but not endangered 
native  vegetation  (Morton  et  al,  2002).  This  action  would,  apparently,  save  5280 
species from extinction, so willingness to pay per species is a lump sum of $38,000 or 
an annual payment of $1900.  
 
Managers will undertake expenditures on control programmes to defend the existing 
environment when they expect an environmental gain.  The defensive expenditure 
method estimates the values of these gains from the expenditures themselves - - the 
expenditure on the marginal unit is a minimum measure of the benefit of that unit.  
For example, Sinden and Griffith (2007) estimated the value of the environmental 
gains from protecting threatened sites and threatened species from expenditures to 
control of 35 weeds across Australia.  They reported that the annual expenditure to 
manage each of 35 weeds in Australia increases by $64,800 for each extra native 
species and $5,800 for each extra site protected. 
 
The opportunity cost of protection is, of course, the loss in agricultural income to 
protect the native vegetation.  While it is a different kind of cost, governments impose 
regulations on landholders to protect native vegetation, and this reduces their options 
for development and so reduces land value.  In an area of northwestern New South 
Wales, Sinden (2004) combined (a) functions of change in land value due to changes 
in  vegetation,  with  (b)  functions  of  the  loss  of  native  species  due  to  changes  in 
vegetation levels.  At current levels of vegetation, the present polices to maintain 30 
per cent of each property in native vegetation would cost at least $148.5m over all 
1.227m ha of farmland - - as a loss in land value.  This is equivalent to  a cost of 
$15.7m for each species protected across this farmland.  Simulations to allow for   6
uncertainty in species numbers, and in the coefficients in the model, showed that there 
was a 0% chance the cost is below $15.7m., a 25% chance it is below $29.1m, and a 
50% chance it is below  $37.4m.  The annuity equivalent of $15.7m is $314,000 
which applies across the whole area. 
 
2.4 An overview 
Values  for  environmental  services  should  be  the  values  that  would  arise  in  a 
competitive market for those services.  So the method to value them should model the 
structural characteristics of the market which include: 
•  many buyers, all facing budget constraints, 
•  many producers all facing input constraints, and 
•  exchanges between buyers and sellers. 
All the methods attempt to model the operation of the competitive market and all 
follow  the  supply/demand  model  of  Figure  1.    But  the  willingness-to-pay  survey 
methods have no effective budget constraints, whereas the methods based on actual 
cost methods do.  So, a priori, the methods based on the actual costs of control appear 
to  offer  reliable  ways  to  value  biodiversity  (Sinden  1994,  and  Sinden  and 
Thampapillai 1999).  The defensive expenditure method appears to be a promising 
way to analyse such cost information. 
 
A review of the limited set of empirical values for biodiversity gains obtained so far 
indicate that: 
•  values from willingness to pay methods exceed the values from cost methods, 
•  values from willingness to pay methods vary from survey to survey and 
•  values from willingness to pay methods are high. 
But methods based on demand and willingness to pay estimate points on a demand 
curve, such as M in Figure 1, whereas supply and cost methods estimate points on the 
supply curve such as M.  This may be another reason why the cost methods appear to 
give lower values then the willingness-to-pay methods for the value of biodiversity 
gains. 
 
3  The defensive expenditure method 
 
Individual households or firms often act to maintain the existing level of utility or 
profit.    They  might,  for  example,  soundproof  houses  against  noise  or  change  the 
source  of  inputs  to  maintain  resource  quality.    The  benefit  of  such  actions  must 
exceed the cost, otherwise they would not be undertaken.  So, in principle, we can 
derive the benefits from these defensive expenditures, hence the intuitive appeal of 
the method. 
 
3.1 The theoretical model 
The  theory  to  apply  these  beliefs  can  be  presented  first  from  the  standpoint  of 
consumer who seeks to maximise utility (Shortle and Abler, 2001). 
    U = U (e, q)          (1) 
with respect to the income constraint 
                                      Y = D (e) + p.q         (2) 
where  U  is  utility,  e  is  environmental  quality,  q  is  the  quantity  of  all  non-
environmental goods and services that are consumed, p is the price of those goods and   7
services, D( ) is the defensive expenditure function that defines the necessary costs to 
“consume” the environmental quality, and Y is income. 
 
The benefit from defending a given environmental quality against an adverse change 
is equal to the extra income (EV) that would be required to restore the consumer’s 
utility back to its original level, after the adverse change has occurred.  In estimating 
this measure of Hicks equivalent variation, the utility before the change must equal 
the utility after the change: 
  U(Y0, e0) = U(Y1, e1)        (3) 
where e is the level of environmental quality before (0) the change and after (1) the 
change.  The ideal measure of defensive expenditures in terms of consumption (DEc) 
is therefore the change in income that restores the original level of utility.  So from 
equation (3) we have: 
   DEc = (Y1 – Y0) = EV        (4) 
This concept of the benefit is hard to measure when the demand for the environmental 
quality is hard to estimate, and when the observable data do not capture any change in 
demand that follows the change in environmental quality. 
 
A  minimum  bound  to  the  benefit  can  be  estimated  from  the  costs  necessary  to 
maintain  the  level  of  environmental  quality  rather  than  from  the  extra  income 
necessary to maintain the level of utility.  This minimum (DEcm) is the expenditure 
necessary to maintain the initial level of environmental quality (e0) before and after 
the change. For the consuming household and following Shortle and Abler (2001): 
 
  DEcm = D(qo, e0) –  D(qo, e1)    (5) 
where e0 is the quality of the environment that is to be maintained. 
 
Equation (5) can also be derived through the production measures to be undertaken to 
guard  against  the  loss  of  a  natural  site  from  a  weed  invasion.    The  defensive 
expenditure (DEp) is now the cost of the extra inputs needed to maintain the initial 
environmental quality of the natural site after the potential invasion. 
 
  DEp = D(e0, w0) – D(e0, w1)    (6) 
 
where eo is the initial level of environmental quality, the weed invasion w.  This 
approach requires only information on the defensive expenditure function D(e, w), 
and the management actions before and after knowledge of the invasion. 
 
3.2 Application to valuation 
 
The concept of defensive expenditures has been widely used to describe the broad 
protective purpose of many cost outlays (McMillan, 2004, Escofet and Brava-Pena, 
2007).  In this use, the concept helps to provide and organise information for choices 
between policies.  For example, Rogers, Sinden and De Lacy (1997) estimate the loss 
in income from irrigated crops when water is diverted to maintain riparian forest in its 
existing state.  In the present work however, we apply the notion more specifically to 
value  particular  gains  in  biodiversity  when  the  native  plant  communities  are 
protected. 
   8
The  method  assumes  that  producers  and  consumers  are  rational,  and  so  no 
expenditures  are  undertaken  unless  benefits  exceed  costs  and  all  expenditures  are 
undertaken when benefits exceed costs. In the context of protecting sites from the 
spread  of  bitou  bush,  the  market  moves  to  Qe  where  demand  and  supply  are  in 
equilibrium (Figure 1). This scenario implies we are we defending the existing levels 
of  environmental  services  at  the  existing  site  rather  than  defending  the  flow  of 
environmental services by increasing the services at other sites. 
 
Consider the protection of many similar reserves of native plant species, where the 
costs to control the weed vary.  The costs include access construction, spraying, hand 
removal, planning and monitoring.  The method assumes that decision makers know 
how a weed invasion affects the flow of environmental services, and that defensive 
actions do not change the flow of environmental services from the pre-invasion level. 
 
Harrington and Portnoy (1987) developed a household production model to assess 
health  pollution  issues.    The  model  included  expenditures  on  goods  explicitly 
purchased to defend the existing levels of air quality and the environmental service 
flows that rest on that quality. They point out that inclusion of defensive expenditures 
may overstate willingness to pay for pollution control if the expenditures enhance 
health quality and so the new equilibrium involves a higher quantity of the service 
because the quality increases. 
 
3.3 Application to the problem 
 
The defensive expenditure method is now applied to value the economic benefits of 
biodiversity gains from management of the weed. The basic procedure is to derive a 
cost function to  model the supply curve AS in Figure 1, and so estimate DEp in 
Equation (6).  The method is likely to provide minimum values as argued above, and 
also because a greater budget allocation might lead to higher expenditures on control 
(Eiswerth, Shaw and Yen, 2005) 
 
 
4 Data collection 
 
Data  on  costs,  site  characteristics  and  quantities  of  biodiversity  protected,  were 
available for over 300 sites identified in the bitou bush TAP.   But data were not 
available  for  all  the  variables  at  each  site.    For  example,  cost  information  was 
sometimes  available  only  for  a  group  of  sites.    When  such  data  could  not  be 
reallocated per site, all sites in the group had to be removed from the sample.  This 
process left 90 sites with a full set of data.  This information is now described and the 
variables are summarised in Table 1, with their mean values over the 90 sites. 
 
4.1 Measures of cost  
 
For each site, annual cash expenditure, external grants, and in-kind contributions were 
available for 2005-2006. They represent the total resources necessary to protect each 
individual site and the biodiversity they contain.  So, total economic cost was defined 
as follows: 
 
Total Economic Cost (COST) = cash expenditures + external grants + in-kind costs  (7)   9
 
Cash  expenditures  are  recurrent  funds  spent  on  wages  and  operating  costs.    The 
external grants are incomes from other state and Commonwealth agencies such as the 
National  Heritage  Trust.    The  in-kind  costs  include  volunteer  labour  costed  as 
(number of volunteers * a wage rate), staff time of the government agencies, and on-
costs to manage the volunteers.   
 
The total economic cost of implementing the TAP in 2005-06 was $2,845,500.  This 
included expenditure by the DECC, Department of Lands, the five coastal Catchment 
Management  Authorities  (CMA),  Lord  Howe  Island  Board,  numerous  coastal 
councils and the University of Wollongong.  The on-ground cost in 2005-06 was 
$2,489,000 which included the costs of control activities, site planning, monitoring of 
priority sites, surveys, training volunteers, and direct co-ordination.  
 
 4.2 Measures of biodiversity and weed threat 
 
The data included the following measures of biodiversity: 
•  the  total  number  of  high  priority,  medium  priority  and  low  priority  species 
(NOSPEC), and 
•  the total number of high priority, medium priority and low priority ecological 
communities, (NOCOM). 
The data also include the number of priority endangered populations, so the total 
number of ecological entities (TNEE) is the sum of all these species, communities and 
populations per site.  
 
The TAP contained data on the degree of risk from bitou bush to each ecological 
entity at each site.  This information was based on the potential impact of bitou bush 
and associated weeds, and the proximity of the site to existing areas of weed invasion.  
The information was scored on a five-point scale (1 = low threat to 5 = high threat) 
for each entity at each site.  So the average score per entity was calculated at each site 
and taken as a measure of the potential impact of the weed (IMPACT).  
 
The potency of the threat at a site depends on both the willingness and ability of 
managers  to  protect  the  site.    In  turn,  willingness  depends  fundamentally  on  the 
number  of  native  species,  communities,  and  populations  at  the  site,  and  ability 
depends on the difficulty of control of bitou bush including the difficulties of access, 
and the level of the invasion so far.  All of these factors are captured as the number of 
ecological entities protected per worker (NEPPW) per year per site.  We assumed that 
the cost per worker, including on-costs, was $90,000 per year and so the number of 
workers was calculated as ((cash +external grants)/90,000).  The variable: 
 
NEPPW = TNEE/Number of workers        (8)  
 
measures  the  number  of  entities  protected  per  employee  per  year  at  each  site.  
Increases in the value of NEPPW indicate increases in the effectiveness of control 
measures  in  protecting  biodiversity.    So  the  cost  per  site  should  decrease  with 
increases in this variable. 
  
4.3 Tenure, location and area 
   10
There are 38 different kinds of land ownership across sites, and management may 
vary with tenure. So the three main tenures sites were identified and coded as TNP = 
1 if the site was administered by the National Parks and Wildlife Service and 0 if 
otherwise,  TLG  =  1  if  Local  Government  and  0  if  otherwise,  and  TDL  =  1  if 
Department of Lands and 0 if otherwise.  
 
The 90 sites were located along 1100 kilometres of coast and covered five Catchment 
Management  Authority  areas.  Environmental  conditions,  the  nature  of  the  weed 
invasion and management responses, are likely to vary over this length of coastline 
and by CMA region so dummy variables were introduced for the catchments with 
more than ten sites.  The location variable LNR was coded as 1 = Northern Rivers 
Catchment  and  0  =  otherwise,  LHC  was  coded  as  1  =  Hunter  Central  Rivers 
Catchment and 0 = otherwise, and LSR was coded as 1 = Southern Rivers Catchment 




The data are now analysed to identify: 
•  the total cost per site and per ecological entity protected, 
•  the cost specifically due to biodiversity protection at the “mean”, and  
•  the cost specifically due to biodiversity protection at market equilibrium. 
At each of these three stages, the benefits are interpreted.  Thus we estimate the total 
benefit  per  site  from  all  “sources”,  the  benefits  due  to  the  “mean”  quantity  of 
biodiversity protection, and the benefit due to the ‘equilibrium” quantity. 
 
5.1 The total benefit per site and per ecological entity protected 
 
5.1.1 Benefits per site 
How much has been spent to defend the sites against bitou bush?  Are some sites 
relatively costly to protect while others are relatively cheap?  And what do these 
expenditures mean for the valuation of the benefits from biodiversity protection? The 
90 sites were ranked in order of increasing cost which is expressed as the present 
values of expenditures over the five years of the Plan  (with the annuity equivalents in 
parentheses). The following results were observed. 
•  The minimum cost per site was $2,165 ($110). 
•  The mean cost per site was $121,348 ($6,070). 
•  The maximum cost per site was $1,068,586 ($53,430). 
The site with  the highest cost was SR 20,  Bherwerre Peninsula  in Booderee  NP, 
which  contained  three  high  and  medium  priority  species  and  seven  different 
ecological communities. Since this amount has been spent to save these ten ecological 
entities, protection must be worth at least this amount and so the benefits of protection 
appear to be worth at least $53,430 per year for this kind of site.  This particular site 
has what is believed to be the largest infestation of the weed on the south coast of 
New South Wales, and is at the edge of the Southern Containment Zone that is kept 
clear of the weed to prevent its spread.  
 
5.1.2 Benefits per entity protected 
A more relevant indicator of the cost of biodiversity protection might be the cost per 
ecological entity protected, so the 90 sites were now ranked on this criterion (Figure   11
2).  The costs, again as present values over five years (with annuity equivalents) were 
as follows. 
•  The minium cost per entity was $100 ($5). 
•  The mean cost per entity was $8,121 ($410). 
•  The maximum cost per entity was $50,000 ($2,500) 
The figure shows that the cost per entity increases only slowly up to about 70 of the 
sites, but then increases steeply for the last 20 sites. 
 
The three sites with the highest costs per entity are shown in Table 2.  Sites NR45 and 
NR55 each contains one priority ecological entity. These are Plectranthus cremmus 
and Littoral Rainforest respectively, both of which occur at other sites.  Site SM3 
contains two priority ecological communities, namely Grassy Headlands and Coastal 
Banksia Woodland.  Both of these also occur at other sites. If the biodiversity is 
protected  at  other  sites  are  there  additional  reasons  for  protecting  these  high-cost 
sites?  For example, do the sites form part of the National Containment Zones to stop 
spread of the weed or are they in designated buffer zones around other, more crucial 
areas?   But they have been protected, so we conclude that the entities in NR45, NR55 
and SM3 are worth up to $2500 per year to the community. 
 
5.2  Benefits from biodiversity protection at the “mean” quantity of biodiversity 
 
5.2.1 The general model 
The values implied from the observation of expenditures assume that all changes in 
cost are due to changes in biodiversity alone.  For example, they assume that the 
entire $2,500 per entity per year from SM3 accrues to biodiversity alone.   These 
values  are  good  starting  points  for  policy  choices,  but  they  will  exceed  the  true 
benefits for biodiversity protection alone if other factors affect the cost.  So we now 
separate  the effects of biodiversity from  the  potential impacts  of weed  threat,  the 
difficulties of control, differences in land tenure, and differences in location. 
 
The analytical task is to identify the way the cost of protection varies with these 
different characteristics of the site, including the biodiversity that is protected.  The 
following general function, which models the supply function AS in Figure 1, was 
therefore specified. 
 
Cost  = f (number of priority species protected, number of priority communities 
protected,  potential  impact  of  the  weed  invasion,  difficulty  of  weed 
control,  land tenure, and location)                                                 (9)
                                                                                    
The following data are available to estimate equation (9).  Following the symbols of 
Section 4 which are summarised in Table 2: 
 
COST = f (NOSPEC, NOCOM, IMPACT, NEPPW, TNP, TLG, TDL, LNR, LHC  
      and LSR)                       (10) 
     
When  estimated,  this  model  provides  the  information  to  value  the  environmental 
benefits from managing weeds to protect biodiversity. 
 
5.2.2  The  method of estimation   12
The relationship of COST to the explanatory factors in Equation (10) is likely to be 
curvilinear, as postulated in Figure 1.  The costs per entity of Figure 2 exhibit a 
geometrically-increasing trend, as did the costs per site when they were graphed.  So 
the dependant variable (COST) was transformed to logarithms to the base 10, but all 
the explanatory variables (NOSPEC to LSR) were left in their arithmetic form. 
 
The estimated functions are shown in Table 3.  To begin with all the variables were 
included  in  an  ordinary  least  squares  regression  to  give  Equation  (11)  and  then 
particular variables were excluded on the basis of diagnostic tests to give Equations 
(12) and (13).  In particular, LNR and LHC were correlated at 0.616 per cent in 
Equation (11).  Although the coefficient of determination of Equation (11) was higher 
at 0.757 and these are both dummy variables, LHC was excluded to give Equation 
(12) to avoid any possibility of multi-collinearity.  Variables TNP, TLG and TDL are 
all included in Equation (11). But TNP was related at 0.463 per cent to TLG, so TLG 
was excluded from Equation (12) for similar reasons. The highest correlation of the 
remaining explanatory variables in equation (12) was 0.493 for LNR and LSR so 
LNR was now excluded to give Equation (13) because it had the highest correlations 
with NOSPEC and NOCOM (0.324 as opposed to 0.156, and 0.470 as opposed to 
0.342). 
 
The  coefficients  per  variable  vary  little  across  the  three  equations  of  Table  3. 
Equation (12) has slightly higher adjusted R squared statistics and slightly higher, or 
equal,  t-statistics  on  all  its  variables  so  this  equation  is  preferred.    The  highest 
remaining correlation in Equation (12) was 0.493 between LNR and LSR. 
 
5.2.3 Interpretation of the estimated equations 
The estimated equations provide information to explore the way bitou bush affects 
management and to value the biodiversity gains from management.  Equation (12) 
indicates that more is spent on weed control when: 
•  there are more priority native species at a site, 
•  there are more priority communities at a site, 
•  the potential impact of the weed is greater, and. 
•  the site is administered by local government. 
 
Less is spent per site when: 
•  the number of entities protected per employee-year increases, 
•  the site is administered by the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and 
•  even less is spent when the site is administered by the Department of Lands. 
The  National  Parks  and  Wildlife  Service  has  had  management  and  expenditure 
programmes at their sites over many years, and is likely to be more efficient now in 
control than other agencies. So the requirement for expenditure at their sites in the 
TAP is likely to be less ceteris paribus, hence the negative sign on TNP. 
 
All the dummy variables for location (LNR, LHC, LSR) have negative signs.  But 
only LNR and LSR significant and LSR has the highest negative coefficient.  So the 
costs  per  site  decrease  below  the  mean  for  the  Northern  Rivers  Catchment 
Management Authority but they decrease even more in the Southern Rivers CMA 
 
5.2.4 The benefits from biodiversity protection   13
The benefits from biodiversity protection may now be valued as follows.  The extra 
cost that is expended to protect an extra ecological entity at the mean is a measure of 
this benefit.  The extra cost is represented by M at Qm in Figure 1 and can be derived 
as follows. 
 
In  the  semi-logarithmic  models  of  Table  3,  the  dependent  variable  has  been 
transformed into logarithms while the explanatory variables retain their arithmetic 
form.  So: 
 
the extra cost of the first extra entity = ∂y/∂x = β (Y) =   β (COST)          (14) 
 
where  β is the coefficient on the explanatory variable and COST is the arithmetic 
value of total cost per site calculated at the logarithmic mean. The mean total cost per 
site in  logarithms is  4.849, the arithmetic value of this mean  is  $70,650, and  the 
coefficient for the number of species is 0.05949.  The extra cost is therefore $4203 as 
a  present  value,  or  $210  as  an  annuity.    In  a  similar  way,  the  extra  cost  of  a 
community is a present value of $5377 or an annuity of $270. 
 
Following  the  defensive  expenditure  approach  and  the  assumptions  of  market 
transactions, these extra costs are the estimates of the minimum benefits of the gains 
in biodiversity protection.  The annual benefit of protecting a species is therefore 
$210 and the annual benefit of protecting a community is $270 per year.  These two 
benefits are listed in Table 4.  The values per site were calculated as (mean number of 
species per site x this value per species) plus (mean number of communities per site x 
this value per community).  The  value  per  extra  site,  calculated  in  this  way,  was 
$1020. 
 
5.3 Benefits from biodiversity protection at the “equilibrium” quantity of 
biodiversity 
 
The values of biodiversity gains for use in a benefit-cost analysis should be the values 
that would form in a competitive market in equilibrium, if such a market existed.  The 
values should therefore be derived by modelling the equilibrium transaction at E in 
Figure 1.  In contrast, the values of the previous section have necessarily been derived 
for the “mean” number of species or communities protected per site.  This would be 
represented at say B for quantity Qm in the figure.  We would expect the “equilibrium” 
values at E for quantity Qe to be higher, even much higher, than the values for the 
mean quantity Qm. 
 
Management at all the sites in the bitou TAP has been funded so the equilibrium 
values  can  be  approximated  from  the  highest  marginal  cost  per  species  or  per 
community that has been expended.  This, of course, assumes that the budgets were 
sufficient  to  allow  managers  to  undertake all  control  where  the  perceived  benefit 
exceeded  the  cost,  so  the  last  (or  most  costly)  exchange  becomes  the  marginal 
transaction for the unit at Qe. We can therefore derive supply curves for the extra 
species  and  communities  protected  over  the  range  from  the  mean  number  (2.54 
species or 1.80 communities) to the maximum number (12 species or 9 communities) 
protected.  The procedure, to apply Equation (14) and derive these marginal costs, is 
now illustrated for the protection of species.  
   14
Instead of just β and the mean value of COST as in Equation (14), we now have: 
 
the extra cost of the nth extra entity  = β (COST + n *β)                (15) 
 
where  n  varies  from  1  to  12    for  the  extra  species  and  1  to  9  for  the  extra 
communities,  β  is  again  the  coefficient  on  the  explanatory  variable  (NOSPEC  or 
NOCOM), and COST is the arithmetic value of the total cost per site in logarithms at 
each  number  of  extra  entities.    The  term  in  parentheses  is  calculated  first  as  a 
logarithmic sum and then converted to its arithmetic equivalent before multiplying by 
the coefficient.  If we are calculating the values at the means as in section 5.2.4, 
Equation (15) reduces to Equation (14) because n, the number of extra entities, is nil.    
 
Equation (15) was applied with increasing levels of n for species and communities 
separately to give the two marginal cost curves of Figure 3.    The “equilibrium” 
values were $1020 per species protected (for the 12th species), $1300 per community 
protected (for the 9th community protected).  The value per site, as mean number of 





6.1 The benefit values 
 
The benefits of Table 4 represent the value of the extra unit of biodiversity at the mid-
point for the mean number protected (Row 1) following Qm in Figure 1, and at a 
proxy for the equilibrium number protected (Row 2) following Qe.  The value of the 
equivalent biodiversity gains per site is $1020 per year at the mean quantity of species 
and communities, and $5020 at the equilibrium quantities.  This particular mean site 
value is comparable to the value of $5860 from Sinden and Griffith (2007), which 
was derived from an analysis of management costs to protect against similar weed 
invasions in similar situations. 
 
These are of course annual values per site.  Over 300 sites in the TAP, the benefit 
value is $306,000 per year (300 x $1020) at the mean quantities, or $6.12m as a 
present  value.    At  the  “equilibrium”  quantities,  we  have  $1.506  m  per  year  or 
$30.12m as a present value. 
 
In 2001, the Centre for International Economics undertook a benefit-cost analysis of 
bio-control of bitou bush. They estimated the willingness to pay per household for the 
extra biodiversity on the same kind of sites to be between $1 and $2 per year for each 
household living within 50 kms of the affected areas.  We now assume that all 2.3m 
households  in  NSW  are  affected  by  the  actions  of  the  NSW  National  Parks  and 
Wildlife Service.  With a 3 per cent rate of inflation from 2001 to 2006 (the date of 
the TAP), the CIE (2001) value of the biodiversity protected lies between $2.667m 
($1 x 2.3m x 1.16 for inflation)  and $5.332m ($2 x 2.3m x 1.16).  This willingness-
to-pay estimate lies close to, but rather above the preferred defensive–expenditure 
estimate of $1.506m per year - - as we would expect.  
 
Values derived through actual expenditures are necessarily minimum estimates of the 
benefit.  But  they  are  defensible  estimates  because  they  are  based  on  actual   15
expenditures.  They are also economic values, which attempt to value the equilibrium 
price that would emerge in a competitive market if one existed.  They are, obviously, 
not ecological or biological values in any sense. 
 
6.2 The valuation process 
 
In the preliminary phase of model building, the individual number of high, medium 
and low priority species, as well as the total number of high, medium and low priority 
species in aggregate, were each regressed against COST. But only the total proved 
significant.  The same result occurred for the numbers of communities, so the analysis 
was based on the total number of priority species at each site (NOSPEC) and the total 
number of priority communities at each (NOCOM).  The analysis therefore implicitly 
assumes that all species are of equal economic worth and all communities are of equal 
economic worth.  
 
The defensive expenditure method assumes that decision makers are rational and so 
undertake protection activities when the benefits exceed costs, and have sufficient 
budget to undertake all activities where benefits exceed costs.  Then the estimated 
“equilibrium values in Table 4 would be the  “true” market values of protection of 
biodiversity.    In  reality  of  course,  budgets  are  limited  and  other  factors  such  as 
regional rather than state-wide targets, motivate the choice of activities.  But in the 
TAP, choice of activity rested closely on the protection of biodiversity. 
 
The analysis has provided values for individual species, communities, and sites. But 
are these values in their biologically-appropriate order and relative magnitude?  Under 
the NSW Threatened Species Conservation Act, native biodiversity can be listed as 
individual species, a specific population of a species, or an ecological community.  A 
population  is  “smaller”  than  a  species  while  a  community  comprises  a  group  of 
species in its biophysical habitat.  The number of populations proved to be unrelated 
to costs but the value for community values exceeded the value for species - - as 
perhaps might be expected. 
 
We have taken the maximum number of species per site (twelve) over the set of sites, 
and the maximum number of communities per site (nine) over the set of sites, as the 
proxy for the “equilibrium” number of each (Qe).  The true equilibrium numbers will 
exceed these levels because existing expenditures have been taken to protect existing 
sites but they may also have been taken to protect other sites with more species and 
communities.  Thus, further work should be undertaken to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding Qe. 
 
6.3 The policy implications 
 
How might these results assist with policy choices? 
•  The biodiversity values obtained here, together with the methods of analysis 
developed in Sinden et al (2008) and Hester et al (2006), could be applied to 
assess the economic worth of other threat abatement plans that concern similar 
kinds of weeds and vegetation. 
   16
•  The processes for selecting a set of sites for future threat abatement plans 
might now be reconsidered, to review the inclusion of high-cost sites where all 
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Table 1  Variables used in the analysis of the costs for 90 sites 
Symbol  Description  Mean 
COST  Total economic cost $ per year for five years  28,025 
     
  Measures of biodiversity   
NOSPEC  Total no of high, medium, and low priority species  2.54 
NOCOM  Total no of high, medium and low priority communities  1.80 
NOPOP  Total no of high priority populations  0.04 
TNEE  Total number of ecological entities*  4.39 
     
  Measures of weed threat   
IMPACT  Potential weed impact (mean score, 1 low to 5 high)  3.40 
NEPPW  Number of entities protected per worker per year  98.72 
     
  Land tenure   
TNP  Tenure =1 if administered by NPWS, 0 otherwise  0.48 
TLG  Tenure =1 if local government, 0 otherwise  0.19 
TDL  Tenure =1 if Department of Lands, 0 otherwise  0.07 
     
  Location**   
LNR  Location =1 if Northern Rivers CMA, 0 otherwise  0.51 
LHC  Location =1 if Hunter Central CMA, 0 otherwise  0.27 
LSR  Location =1 if Southern Rivers CMA, 0 otherwise  0.19 
* All biodiversity identified here 
**  CMA  indicates  Catchment  Management  Authority.    Variables  for  the  Sydney 
Metropolitan and Hawkesbury Nepean CMA’s are excluded, because there were too 






Table 2 The cost per entity for the three most costly sites 
Costs per entity ($)  Site  Number of 
entities  Present value  Annuity equivalent 
       
NR45  1  30,000  1500 
NR55  1  41,730  2100 
SM3  2  50,000  2500   19
Table 3  Equations* to explain variations in cost:  90 sites 
 
Equation  Explanatory 
variables  11  12  13 
Management factors 
NOSPEC  0.06182 (3.8)  0.05949 (3.8)  0.05156 (3.4) 
NOCOM  0.07831 (3.2)  0.07611 (3.1)  0.09151 (3.9) 
IMPACT  0.055989 (1.8)  0.06000 (2.0)  0.05550 (1.8) 
NEPPW  -0.00145 (7.8)  -0.0014 (8.0)  -0.0014 (7.7) 
       
Land tenure of site 
TNP  -0.13837 (1.3)  -0.1672 (1.9)  -0.1643 (1.9) 
TLG  0.06691 (0.6)     
TDL  -0.33469 (1.9)  -0.3909 (2.4)  -0.3119 (2.0) 
       
Location of site 
LNR  -0.30940 (1.5)  -0.1744 (1.8)   
LHC  -0.15741 (0.7)     
LSR  -0.40301 (1.8)  -0.2814 (2.3)  -0.1975 (1.7) 
       
Intercept  4.8553  4.7479  4.6411 
R  0.757  0.755  0.743 
R
2  0.574  0.570  0.553 
Adj R
2  0.520  0.527  0.514 
N  90  90  90 
* These equations are all models of the function: 
COST = f (NOSPEC, NOCOM, IMPACT, NEPPW, TNP, TLG, TDL, LNR, LHC, 
and LSR), together with their R and R
 squared and adjusted R squared statistics.  The 




Table 4 Values for biodiversity gains from analysis of 90 sites 
Values ($ annuities)  Situation 
Per species  Per community  Per site 
1  At the mean  210  270  1020 
2  At  “Equilibrium”  1050  1300  5020 
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Fig 3   Marginal costs of protecting native plants: series 1 
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